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State Legislative Control over the
Conditions of Public Employment: Defining
the Scope of Collective Bargaining for State
and Municipal Employees
PatriciaN. Blair*
I.

INTRODUCTION: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RIGHT

To

BARGAIN

COLLECTIVELY

In 1816, the federal service under President James Madison consisted of 4,000 employees.' By 1950, the federal government had
2,120,000 persons on its payroll, while state and municipal governments
employed another 4,290,000.2 Today there are 2,720,000 federal employees 3 and 10,150,000 employees of state and municipal governments.' The emergence of a new labor movement aimed at attaining
for public employees the right to bargain collectively, a right guaranteed
to workers in the private sector by the 1935 National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), 5 recently has accompanied this expansion of government
employment.' National legislation, however, has never extended the
right to bargain collectively to public employees; indeed, all governments-federal, state, and local-traditionally have prohibited, either
by statute or judicial decision, collective bargaining in their public serv* Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. B.S., 1965, J.D., 1968,
Indiana University School of Law; LL.M., 1969, University of Michigan School of Law. This
article was submitted by the author in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the S.J.D. degree,
University of Michigan School of Law.
I. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 710 (1965).

2. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 429 (89th ed. 1968).
3. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 421 (92d ed. 1971).
4. Id.
5. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
6. See. e.g., Jones, Union Militancy of Nation's 10.5 Million Public Employees Is Found
Increasing, N.Y. Times, April 2, 1967, at 79, col. 1.
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ices. 7 In 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated the view that

prevailed throughout the United States prior to the 1960's:8
All government employees should realize that the process of collective bargaining,
as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service. It has its
distinct and insurmountable limitations when applied to public personnel management. The very nature and purposes of the government make it impossible for
administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in mutual discussions with employee organizations. The employer is the whole people who speak
by means of laws enacted by their representatives in Congress. Accordingly, administratives and employees alike are governed and guided, and in many instances
restricted, by laws which establish policies, procedures, or rules in personnel matters.9

In spite of this early resistance, public employer collective bargain-

ing is now an established fact at the federal level and in the majority of
state and local governments. The transition from uniform disapproval
to majority acceptance of public employer collective bargaining began
in 1955, when New Hampshire adopted legislation authorizing town
governments to engage in collective bargaining with public employee

unions.' 0 Two years later the Minnesota legislature enacted a law requiring all public employers to meet at regular intervals with representatives
selected by their workers in order to negotiate over working conditions

in the public service." By 1959, Wisconsin 2 and Massachusetts 3 similarly had enacted legislation authorizing municipalities to bargain

collectively with representatives chosen by municipal employees, and
Alaska had adopted a law empowering all its "political subdivisions"
to conclude collective bargaining agreements.

4

7. For an excellent review of the legal theories utilized by courts to invalidate public employer collective bargaining in the absence of enabling or prohibiting legislation see Dole, State
and Local Public Employee Collective Bargaining in the Absence of Explicit Legislative
Authorization, 54 IowA L. REV. 539 (1969).
8. There were, of course, exceptions to this almost universal disapproval of public employee
collective bargaining. At the federal level, both the Tennessee Valley Authority and Department
of the Interior had extensive union relations including the signing of written agreements during
the 1950's. See Avery, The TVA and Labor Relations: A Review, 16 J. POL. 413 (1954); Terry,
Collective Bargainingin the U.S. Department of the Interior,22 PUB. AD. REV. 19 (1962). At the
local level, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, New Haven, Connecticut, and Cincinnati, Ohio, began
negotiations with unions representing their public employees in the mid-50's. See Klaus, Labor
Relations in the Public Service: Exploration and Experiment, 10 SYRACUSE L. REv. 183 (1959).
9. Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Luther C. Steward, President of the National
Federation of Federal Employees, Aug. 16, 1937, in C. RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL
EMPLOYE LAW 436-37 (1946).
10. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:3 (1970) (originally enacted as Law of July 14, 1955).
11. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.52 (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1972).
12. Wis. Laws ch. 501, § 1 (1959), as amended, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (Supp. 1972).
13. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40, § 4C (1961), as amended, ch. 149, §§ 178G-N (Supp. 1971).
14. ALAS. STAT. § 23.40.010 (1962).
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On January 17, 1962, President John F. Kennedy issued Executive
Order 10988,' which extended the rights of unionization and collective
bargaining to federal employees. Executive Order 10988 was; however,
more comprehensive than its earlier state counterparts. While existing
state laws merely authorized or required various public employers to
engage in collective bargaining, Executive Order 10988 established a
complete framework for management-employee relations similar to
the one prevailing in the private sector under the NLRA. 6 The Order
not only recognized the right of federal employees to engage in collective
bargaining, but also set forth methods for defining the appropriate
collective bargaining unit and ascertaining the employees' preference on
which union, if any, should represent them in negotiations with management. Executive Order 10988 also adopted the NLRA concept of exclusive recognition for the bargaining agent selected by a majority of the
workers in the appropriate unit, defined the scope of bargainable subjects, and prohibited specified activities by management and labor organizations.
Since the promulgation of Executive Order 10988, 34 states have
adopted legislation either permitting or requiring designated public
employers 7 to bargain collectively with their employees and, in many
instances, to enter binding contracts covering those matters on which
the parties agree.' 8 Some of the recent state laws, following the pattern
15. 3 C.F.R. 521 (Comp. 1959-63), 5 U.S.C. § 631 (1964), revoked by Exec. Order No.
11,491. 3 C.F.R. 191 (Comp. 1969), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970), as amended, 3 C.F.R. 505 (1972).
On October 29, 1969, President Richard M. Nixon issued Executive Order 11491, which superseded Executive Order 10988. Executive Order 11491 aligns labor-management relations in the
federal sector closely with labor-management relations in the NLRA-regulated private sector, but
retains unique concepts introduced by Executive Order 10988. See note 16 infra. Executive Order
11491, however, does not apply to United States Postal Service employees. The Postal Reorganiza- •
tion Act of 1970, 39 U.S.C. §§ 1201-09 (1970), instead grants them virtually all rights-except
the right to strike-enjoyed by private industrial workers under the NLRA.
16. Executive Order 10988, however, contained some unique features that have no counterpart in the NLRA-regulated private sector. For example, it provides for advisory grievance arbitration and for several varieties of nonexclusive as well as exclusive recognition of unions as bargaining
agents.
17. Some states have a single statute that either authorizes or requires all state public
employers to engage in collective bargaining. Other states divide their public employers into
categories, such as school boards or fire departments, and by separate legislation authorize or
require each different group to engage in collective bargaining. Still other states have enacted single
public employer collective bargaining acts that authorize or require only a limited group of public
employers to engage in collective bargaining.
18. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 37, § 450(3) (Supp. 1971) (firemen); ALAS. STAT. § 14.20.550
(1971) (teachers); ALAS. STAT. § 23.40.010 (1962) (public employees generally); CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 13082 (West 1969) (teachers); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505 (West Supp. 1972) (municipal
employees); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3525 (West Supp. 1972) (state employees); CAL. LABOR
CODE § 1962 (West 1971) (firemen); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 70120 (West 1965) (transit work-
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set by Executive Order 10988 and the NLRA, establish criteria for
defining the appropriate collective bargaining unit, provide for the exclusive recognition of bargaining agents, define the scope of negotiable
subjects, and designate particular activities as unfair labor practices. 9
ers); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 7-468 (Supp. 1969) (municipal employees); CONN. GEN. STAT.
REv. § 10-153(d) (Supp. 1969) (teachers); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 1613, tit. 19, § 801 (Supp.
1970) (transportation workers); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4001 (Supp. 1970) (public school
employees); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1301 (Supp. 1970) (public employees generally, except
teachers and elected or appointed public officials); Florida Firefighters Act, 4 LAB. REL. REP.
19:214a (Jan. 1, 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 839.221 (1965) (public employees); HAWAII REV.
LAws § 89-3 (Supp. 1971) (public employees generally); IDAHO CODE, § 44-1802 (Supp. 1971)
(firemen); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 328 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (transit workers); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 72-5414 (Supp. 1971) (teachers); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4328 (Supp. 1971) (public employees except supervisors, teachers, elected and management officials); Ky. Firefighters Act, 4
LAB. REL. REP. 27:217 (April 17, 1972); Ky. Police Act, 4 LAB. REL. REP. 27:225 (June 16, 1972);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:890 (Supp. 1972) (transit workers); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
26, § 965 (Supp. 1972) (municipal employees); MD. ANN. CODE art. 64B, § 37(b) (1972) (transit
workers); MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, § 160 (1969) (teachers); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 178(F)
(Supp. 1971) (state employees); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 178(H) (Supp. 1971) (municipal
employees); MASS. ANN. LAWS Ch. 161A, § 19 (1970) (transit workers); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 17.455(9) (1968) (public employees); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.65 (Supp. 1972) (public
employees generally); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.510 (1966) (all public employees except police,
deputy sheriffs, and teachers); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 25-6119 (1971) (teachers); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 79-1287 (1968) (teachers); NEv. REV. STAT. § 288.150 (1971) (local government employees); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:3 (1970) (municipal employees); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 98C:2 (Supp. 1971) (state employees); N.H. Policemen's Collective Bargaining Act, 4A LAB. REL.
REP. 39:205 (May 1, 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Supp. 1972) (all public employees);
N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAWS § 203 (McKinney Supp. 1972) (all public employees); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 15-38.1-08 (1971) (teachers); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 548.4 (Supp. 1972) (firemen,
policemen, and municipal employees); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 509.2 (1972) (teachers); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 243.730 (1971) (all public employees except teachers); ORE. REV. STAT. § 342A50
(1971) (teachers); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.1 (Supp. 1972) (police and firemen); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.401 (Supp. 1972) (all public employees except police, firemen, and transit
employees); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 39951 (Supp. 1972) (transit workers); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 28-9.1-6 (Supp. 1971) (firemen); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.2-6 (Supp. 1971) (policemen); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.3-4 (1968) (teachers); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.4-3
(1968) (municipal employees); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-11-1 (Supp. 1971) (state employees);
S.D. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 3-18-2 (Supp. 1972) (all public employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 903
(Supp. 1972) (state employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1982 (Supp. 1972) (teachers); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 1703 (Supp. 1972) (municipal employees); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.72.030
(1970) (teachers); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.010 (Supp. 1971) (municipal and state employees); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 53.18.020 (Supp. 1971) (port district employees); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 66.94(29) (1965) (transit workers); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(2) (Supp. 1972) (municipal
employees); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.82 (Supp. 1972) (state employees); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27266 (1967) (firemen).
19. See CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 7-467 to -478 (Supp. 1969); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 1301-12 (Supp. 1970); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 89-3 (Supp. 1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 961-72 (Supp. 1972); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, §§ 178D, 178F-178N (Supp. 1971); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 179.61-.77 (Supp. 1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 105.500.530 (1966); N.J. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 34:13A-1 to -11 (Supp. 1972); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §§ 200-14 (McKinney Supp. 1972);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-9.4-1 to -19 (Supp. 1972); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 3-18-1 to -17
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A few state laws even create a board or commission that is similar to
the National Labor Relations Board and is charged with administering
the provisions of the act.
Many of the new state public employment labor laws, however, are
not so comprehensive. These less extensive statutes merely authorize
public employers to engage in collective bargaining with their employees, thereby licensing the courts and the parties involved to resolve-without legislative guidance-problems concerning the appropriate bargaining unit, union recognition, the scope of bargaining, and the
tactics of labor and management."
The extent to which a public employment labor act regulates the
collective bargaining process will, of course, affect the character as well
as the resolution of problems that arise during subsequent bargaining
efforts. Nevertheless, differences in the laws approving public employer
collective bargaining should not obscure the realization that all of these
laws were enacted for substantially similar reasons. One explanation for
the rapid enactment of public employment labor laws stems from the
growing strength of labor organizations in the public service. Although
total union membership in the United States increased by only six percent between 1964 and 1966,21 the memberships of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, the American Federation of Government Employees, and the American Federation of
Teachers increased by twenty, forty-two, and fourteen percent
respectively during that same period.2 Strengthened by their expanded
memberships, public employee unions consequently have become potent
political forces directing substantial resources toward lobbying for the
right to bargain collectively. Indeed, their members, seeing the relatively
favorable wages and fringe benefits that private employees have gained
through collective bargaining, consider the right of collective bargaining
to be essential and believe that the conditions of public employment can
never be similarly improved as long as government officials can set
those conditions unilaterally.23 In fact, the utilization of the collective
bargaining process by some public employees, most notably teachers,
(Supp. 1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 901-29 (Supp. 1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1701-07
(Supp. 1972); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 41.56.010-.900 (Supp. 1971); WIS. STAT.
ANN.
I11.80-.94 (Supp. 1972).
20. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 450(3) (Supp. 1971); ALAS. STAT. § 23.40.010 (1962).
21. U.S. Dep't of Labor, News Release, USDL-8413, Sept. 4, 1967, cited in Weisenfeld,
Public Employees Are Still Second Class Citizens, 20 LAB. L.J. 138, 139 n.2 (1969).
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Stieber, Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector, in CHALLENGES TO
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 69 (L. Ulman ed. 1967).
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already has resulted in significant improvements in their basic working
conditions.
A second reason for the enactment of public employment labor
laws is the desire of governments to quell criticism directed at their
willingness to require private employers to engage in collective bargaining while at the same time refusing to implement a similar procedure
for the benefit of their own employees. As the American Bar Association noted in 1955: "A government which imposes upon other employers
certain obligations in dealing with their employees may not in good faith
refuse to deal with its own public servants on a reasonably similar...
basis . ... "1
Serious disruptions in the flow of necessary public services, caused
by an increasing number of public employee strikes,'5 provide a third
explanation for the burgeoning number of laws authorizing or requiring
public employers to engage in collective bargaining.26 These disruptions,
and the public outcry that accompanies them, have forced governments
into searching for orderly procedures to replace the strike as a conflict
resolution device in public employment. Many legislative bodies have
selected a system of collective bargaining based upon informed persua2
sion rather than economic force as the most appropriate replacementY.
The extent to which utilization of the collective bargaining process
will be successful in averting strikes in the public sector, however, depends upon many different factors. For example, success may in large
measure depend upon whether the scope of bargainable subjects is defined in a sufficiently expansive manner to include items that traditionally have resulted in grave employee dissatisfaction. Spokesmen for
24. 2 ABA LABOR RELATIONS SECTION 90 (1955).
25. Strikes by public employees are illegal at the federal level and in all states except
Vermont, Hawaii, and Pennsylvania, which recognize a limited right to strike by public employees
when the strike will not endanger the public health or safety. See HAWAII REV. LAWS § 89-12
(Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Supp. 1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1704 (Supp.
1972).
26. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REP. No. 348, WORK
STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, 1958-1968 (1970), cited in Clark, Public Employee Strikes: Some
Proposed Solutions, 23 LAB. L.J. 111, 112 n.5 (1972).
27. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-1 (Supp. 1971): "The legislature. . . finds that the
enactment of positive legislation establishing guidelines for public employment relations is the best
way to harness and direct the energies of public employees eager to have a voice in determining
their conditions of work, to provide a rational method for dealing with disputes and work stoppages. .. ."

"The legislature declares that it is the public policy of the State to promote harmonious and
cooperative relations between government and its employees and to protect the public by assuring
effective and orderly operations ofgovernment. These policies are best effectuated by (I) recognizing the right of public employees to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining .
(emphasis added).
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public employee unions maintain that unless the scope of collective
bargaining in the public sector is made at least as broad as the scope

prevailing in private industry, subjects over which public employees
presently have grievances will necessarily be excluded from the bargaining process, and collective bargaining will, therefore, be unsuccessful as
a dispute settlement device,' Thus 23 states presently have legislation
defining the scope of collective bargaining for various groups of state
and municipal employees in language similar or identical to that used
in the NLRA, which governs the private sector." This adoption of the
private sector NLRA criteria to define the scope of bargainable subjects
means that public employers will be required to bargain in good faith

concerning "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" ' " upon the demand of their employees. The practical impact of

describing the scope of collective bargaining in such general language
will be to permit the courts, as final arbiters on matters of statutory
construction, to resolve disputes between public employers and employee representatives over whether specific items come within the
broad statutory definition of bargainable subjects.
28.

See, e.g., Address by W. Wildman, Industrial Relations Research Association Spring

Meeting, May 7, 1966, in

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE: THEORY AND

PRACTICE (K. Warner ed. 1967).
29. ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 450(2) (Supp. 1969) (firemen); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3530 (West
Supp. 1972) (state employees); CAL. LABOR CODE § 1962 (1971) (firemen); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 10-153(d) (Supp. 1972) (teachers); IDAHO CODE § 44-1802 (Supp. 1971) (firemen); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 75-4328 (Supp. 1971) (teachers); Ky. Firefighters Act, § 6(3), 4 LAB. REL. REP.
27:217 (April 17, 1972); LA. REV. STAT. § 23:890 (Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 64B, § 37(b)
(1972) (transit workers); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 178(D) (Supp. 1971) (state employees);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.215 (1967); Mo. REV. STAT. § 105.510 (1966); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 79-1287 (1968); N.H. Policemen's Collective Bargaining Act, 4A LAB. REL. REP. 39:205
(May I, 1972); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-08 (Supp. 1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 548.4
(Supp. 1972) (firemen, policemen, and municipal employees); ORE. REV. STAT. § 243.710(2)
(1969) (all public employees except teachers); ORE. REV. STAT. § 342.450 (1969) (teachers); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.1 (Supp. 1972) (police and firemen); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 29-9.4-3
(1968) (municipal employees); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.1-6 (Supp. 1971) (firemen); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 28-9.2-6 (Supp. 1971) (policemen); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.3-4 (1968) (teachers); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. tit. 3-18-2 (Supp. 1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 901 (Supp. 1971)
(municipal employees); WASH. REV. CODE § 53.18.020 (1969) (port district employees); WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 1ll.70(l)(d) (West Supp. 1972) (municipal employees, excluding police); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 27-266 (1967) (firemen). Some acts impose a duty on public employers to bargain
in good faith over items within the statutory definition of bargainable subjects upon the request of
their employees' representative; others merely authorize public employers to bargain over such
subjects if they so choose.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). Once raised at the bargaining table, subjects within this
definition are mandatorily bargainable, which means that the parties must negotiate over them
until an impasse is reached. See NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). In the private
sector, subjects not within this definition are negotiable on the mutual consent of labor and
management.
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Of course, the problem of determining whether specific items come
within the meaning of the general phrase, "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment," is one the courts regularly encounter in the private sector under the NLRA. Yet, when the NLRA
language is transposed from the private to the public sector, the courts
may have to confront a peculiar problem of statutory construction that
cannot occur in the private sector. The difficulty arises because, Uinlike
the situation in private industry, control over the working conditions in
most state and local governments normally is divided among several
different bodies and officials. In order to understand the precise nature
of this problem, one must first appreciate the diffusion of authority over
public employment working conditions which presently exists in most
state and local governments and into which the state legislatures have
thrust public employment bargaining laws.
II.

DIFFUSION OF AUTHORITY OVER THE CONDITIONS OF PUBLIC

EM-

PLOYMENT

In the absence of an explicit provision to the contrary, 3 state
courts have interpreted their constitutions as delegating the power to
establish employment conditions for state employees to the state's legislative body.32 The legislatures generally have redelegated some power
over employment conditions to various state executive officials and possibly to a state civil service commission; those officials and commissions
establish without further approval all employment conditions within the
ambit of their delegated powers. Should the state legislature wish to
regulate a condition of employment that is within the power it has
delegated to an executive official or commission, however, it can do so
simply by enacting a law that establishes the desired condition and, until
repealed, also has the effect of suspending the prior delegation.
State legislatures commonly do not redelegate all their powers over
state employment conditions to executive officials and commissions.
Typically they directly exercise their undelegated powers to establish
those conditions of state employment whose implementation requires
appropriations from state tax moneys. In some states, the number of
subjects regulated by undelegated legislative power is more expansive,
and only the less significant conditions of employment are set by persons
or entities other than the legislature. Consequently, it is common to find
diffusions of authority that permit the director of each state agency to
3 1. A few state constitutions contain provisions vesting power to establish the conditions of
state employment in a civil service commission. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
32. See, e.g., City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947).
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establish many of the basic employment conditions for the agency's
employees, while at the same time the state's chief executive officer, the
state legislature, or perhaps a state civil service commission, establishes
3
the remaining conditions for the same workers. 1
Authority over employment conditions at the municipal level may
be even more diffused. In states that do not have constitutional provisions authorizing home rule for municipal governments, the state constitutions vest power over municipal employment conditions in the state
legislature . 3 The state legislatures, however, ordinarily redelegate the
power to fix most municipal employment conditions to the municipal
governments, which in turn divide their delegated powers among the
municipal legislative body, local executive officials, and, frequently, a
local civil service commission. As in the case of powers that relate to
state-level conditions of employment, state legislatures rarely delegate
their powers to deal with municipal employment conditions when implementation of those conditions would necessitate appropriations from
state tax moneys. Similarly, the state legislature can also suspend the
municipality's power to regulate a particular working condition by passing a law that establishes the condition and makes the law applicable
to municipal governments in spite of their delegated powers. Thus, in
jurisdictions without constitutional home-rule provisions, both the state
and local legislative bodies may regulate some municipal employment
conditions, while local mayors, their various department heads, and
local civil service commissions are likely to have power over other con35
ditions.
State constitutional home-rule provisions" either delegate the
power to regulate all "municipal affairs" directly to the municipal governments themselves 37 or direct the state legislature to enact a statute
33.
(1966).

See N.Y.

GOVERNOR'S COMM. ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT

13

34. 1 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW §§ 1.23, 2.00 (1968).
35. See N.Y. GOVERNOR'S COMM. ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, supra note 33, at 13.
36. The following constitutional provisions authorize home rule for local governments:
ALAS. CON:ST. art. X, § 10; ARIZ. CONST. art. 13, § 2; CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 8; COLO. CONST.
art. XX, §§ 1, 6; CONN. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1, 2; GA. CONST. art. XV,
ch. 2-83; HAWAII CONST. art. VII, § 2; KAN. CONST. art. 12, § 5; LA. CONST. art. 14, § 40;
MASS. CONST. art. II, § 6; MD. CONST. art. XI-E, § 3; MICH. CONST. art. VII, § 22; MINN.
CONST. art. I1, § 3; Mo. CONST. art. 6, §§ 18(a), 19, 31; NEB. CONST. art. XI, § 2; NE. CONST.
art. 8, § 8; N.M. CONST. art. X, § 4; N.Y. CONST. art. 9, §§ 1, 2; OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 7;
OKLA. CONST. art. 18, § 3(a); ORE. CONST. art. XI, § 2; PA. CONST. art. 9, §§ 2, 3; R.I. CONST.
amend. 28, § 2; S.D. CONST. art. X, §§ 4, 5; TENN. CONST. art. 11, § 9; TEx. CONST. art. 11, § 5;
UTAH CONST. art. XI, § 5; WASH. CONST. art. 11, § 10; W. VA. CONST. art. 6, § 39(a); WIs.
CONST. art. 11, § 3.
37. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. 9, §§ I & 2. Some constitutional home-rule provisions
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delegating such powers to the local governments." Although in either
case the courts nevertheless generally consider the conditions of munici-

pal employment to be municipal affairs within the meaning of homerule provisions,39 the power to establish municipal employment condi-

tions still ordinarily remains divided between the state and municipal
governments. Such divisions of power result from the fact that most

home-rule provisions require home-rule municipalities to exercise their
delegated powers in accordance with general state laws and declare that
state laws will supersede municipal ordinances whenever the two conflict.4 0 Consequently, state legislatures can regain the power to regulate
employment conditions in home-rule municipalities simply by enacting
a general law that sets out the conditions desired.
III.

INTERACTION OF AUTHORITY

To

CONTROL THE CONDITIONS OF

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC EMPLOYER LABOR LAWS: THE DANGER OF REALLOCATING LEGISLATIVE POWER

State legislatures have interjected laws authorizing or requiring
public employer collective bargaining into the structure of diffused
power over public employee working conditions. The extent to which

this power structure will create interpretative problems when the courts
and administrative bodies attempt to construe NLRA-like definitions of

bargainable subjects within the new laws depends upon who is statutorily defined as the "public employer" for collective bargaining purposes.
If the public employer is defined to include every governmental body

and official having authority to regulate a subject that the courts might
include within the concept of "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment," then the interpretative problems involved are
similar to those raised under the NLRA because all items possibly
require local governments to frame and adopt a charter for their government before they can take
advantage of the constitutional grant of power to regulate their own affairs. Until a municipal
government adopts such a charter, it cannot regulate its own affairs unless the state legislature first
delegates the necessary powers. In other states, however, the municipal governments need not
adopt a charter in order to exercise home-rule powers. I C. ANTIEAU, supra note 34, at § 3.05.
38. See. e.g., MICH. CONST. art. 7, §§ 21 & 22. As in the case of constitutional home-rule
provisions, a municipality may have to adopt a charter before it can take advantage of legislative
home-rule provisions. See I C. ANTIEAU, supra note 34, at § 3.08.
39. See, e.g., Scheafer v. Herman, 172 Cal. 338, 155 P. 1084 (1916); City of Mansfield v.
Endly, 38 Ohio App. 528, 176 N.E. 462 (1931); State v. City of Milwaukie, 231 Ore. 473, 373
P.2d 680 (1962).
40. 2 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10.19 (3d ed. rev. 1966); Sandalow, The
Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule, 48 MINN. L. REv. 643 (1964). In some states,
however, constitutional home-rule provisions free home-rule municipalities from all legislative
interference in matters solely of local concern.
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encompassed by an NLRA-like definition of bargainable subjects are
regulated by a party who must engage in collective bargaining as a
component of the "public employer."41
The states, however, have not general!y incorporated an expansive
definition of the words, "public employer," into their collective bargaining laws." Instead, they frequently have combined an NLRA-like defi-

nition of bargainable subjects with a definition of the public employer
that excludes the state's legislative body.13 State statutory provisions of
this type will inevitably require the state's judiciary, when it construes
an NLRA-like definition of bargainable subjects, to make decisions that
could reallocate the distribution of power between state legislatures and
executive officials, and between state and local governments.
A.

Tipographical,Pressmen'sand Bindery Unions v. PersonnelDivision
One situation that can result in a reallocation of power within the

41. See note 30 supra. Although a collective bargaining statute may include every governmental body and official having control over employee working conditions within its definition of
the "public employer" who must engage in collective bargaining, a person not included within
the statutory definition nevertheless may establish a few working conditions. For example, some
local government charter provisions that are adopted pursuant to a broad delegation of state
legislative power require the electorate to establish certain municipal working conditions by referendum. In such a situation, when the state legislature imposes a duty to bargain over working
conditions on municipal employers, the courts and administrative agencies must decide either that
working conditions established by referendum are implied exceptions to the statutory scope of
collective bargaining, or that the collective bargaining act requires even electorally established
working conditions to be negotiated by a municipal official on the demand of employee representatives. In 2 recent decisions involving this issue, the Michigan Employment Relations Commission
found that the state's Public Employment Relations Act (PERA), which imposes a duty on city
officials to bargain over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment," and a
city charter provision that requires a referendum to approve certain working conditions were in
"irreconcilable conflict." The Commission then held that the PERA "should prevail over any city
charter, to the extent they may conflict. . . . At the time of recognition of such bargaining
representative, the city is obligated to bargain in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other conditions of employment without regard to any provisions of the city charter
relating to these mandatory subjects of collective bargaining." City of Detroit and Detroit Police
Officers Ass'n. 3 CCH LAB. L. REP., STATE LAWS
49,997.72 (Mar. 18, 1971). According to the
Commission, any agreement reached as a result of these negotiations would bind the city and its
employees' representative despite the contrary charter provision. Accord, City of Flint and Council
29. AFSCME, 3 CCH LAB. L. REP., STATE LAWS 49,996.56 (Apr. 2, 1970). A better approach
might have been to construe the PERA as requiring city officials to bargain over working conditions that require the approval of the electorate, and then to submit any agreement reached to the
electorate for its consideration. The Michigan Commission rejected this alternative, reasoning that
it was too cumbersome for efficient collective bargaining.
42. Many state collective bargaining statutes fail to define the words "public employer." See,
e.g.. ALAS. STAT. § 23.40.010 (1962); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(9) (1968).
43. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3526 (West Supp. 1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-2(9)
(Supp. 1971); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 178(1) (Supp. 1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. § II 1.70(l)(a)
(Supp. 1972).
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present structure of state governments will arise when employees seek
to bargain with state or local officials, whom the statute defines as their
public employer for collective bargaining purposes, over subjects
encompassed by the definition of "wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment," but traditionally regulated by the legislature through its exercise of undelegated powers. A court confronting this
situation must cope with what appears to be a two-horned dilemma: it
could decide that items within the broad statutory definition of bargainable subjects but traditionally established by the legislature through the
exercise of undelegated powers are outside the scope of collective bargaining; or it could conclude that the statutory definition of bargainable
subjects constitutes an implied delegation of the legislature's reserved
power to a public official whom the statute defines as a public employer,
thereby enabling this official to conclude collective contracts covering
all items within the statutory definition. A court adopting the former
alternative might thereby exclude important items from the collective
bargaining process; yet adopting the latter alternative may result in an
unintended reallocation of legislative power.
That precise problem recently confronted the Oregon Public Employee Relations Board, which administers Oregon's Public Employment Relations Act," in Typographical, Pressmen's and Bindery Unions v. Personnel Division. 5 Under the Oregon Act, the "State" is
directed to engage in collective bargaining with its employees over
"employment relations," which are statutorily defined to include "direct
or indirect monetary benefits."46 The Oregon legislature had never delegated its authority to establish wage rates for state employees, and the
Board did not regard the legislature as a necessary party to collective
bargaining under the Act. Prior to the passage of the Public Employment Relations Act, those public officials that the Board deemed the
public employer for purposes of collective bargaining therefore did not
possess the requisite authority to set wage rates, an item clearly within
the statutory scope of bargainable subjects. Consequently, the public
officials refused to negotiate over wage rates with representatives of the
state's employees. The case thus squarely presented the dilemma
posed above. The Board could regard the Act's directive to the state to
bargain over employment relations as an implied delegation of the legislature's reserved power over wage rates to the public officials whom
the Board viewed as the public employer, thereby enabling those
44.
45.
46.

§§ 243.711-.795 (1971).
400 GOV'T E, P. REL. REP. B-6 (March 31, 1971).
ORE. REV. STAT. § 243.711 (1971).
ORE. REV. STAT.
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officials to establish wage rates through collective bargaining. Alternatively, the Board could conclude that wage rates, which traditionally
had been regulated only by the state legislature, were implied exceptions to the statutory definition of bargainable subjects.
The Board rejected the implied delegation of power argument, yet
found that the state employees and their public employers could negotiate over all items within the statutory definition of bargainable subjects. The Board reached this seemingly incongruous result by reasoning
that, although the officials who comprised the "public employer" for
the purpose of collective bargaining could not conclude binding agreements on matters wholly within the undelegated authority of the legislature, they nevertheless were obligated by the statutory definition of
bargainable subjects to negotiate over wage rates and to recommend
any agreement reached to the state legislature for its ultimate approval
or rejection.
In view of the available alternatives, the Oregon Board's construction of the statute seems not only proper, but also extremely desirable.
One alternative would have required the Board to interpret a generalized
definition of bargainable subjects as impliedly effecting a broad delegation of legislative power. Under that interpretation, all working conditions previously requiring legislative approval prior to their final establishment would thereafter have been subject to final establishment
through collective bargaining with a nonlegislative official. Such a drastic reallocation of governmental power, however, should follow only
from a clear expression of legislative intent. To effect a severe redistribution of governmental power from no more than a very general definitional phrase unreasonably presupposes the existence of the requisite
legislative intent.
The second alternative interpretation available to the Oregon Public Employee Relations Board would have forced it to exclude from the
statutory definition of bargainable subjects all items traditionally established by the state legislature through the exercise of its undelegated
powers. Since Oregon, like most other jurisdictions,47 requires the state
legislature to approve any expenditure of tax revenues, that interpretation would exclude from the collective bargaining process any working
conditions whose implementation requires appropriations from state tax
moneys." It would entail even more drastic exclusions from the range
47.

See, e.g.,

ILLINOIS GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY COMM'N ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT POLICY

FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15-16

(1967).

48. Normally, only the working conditions of state employees, as distinguished from the
working conditions of municipal employees, will involve expenditures from state tax moneys. See
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of bargainable subjects in those jurisdictions in which the state legislatures exercise their undelegated power to establish all the fundamental
conditions of public employment and permit executive officials and
personnel boards to fix only the less significant conditions, such as
questions relating to lunch hours and work breaks. 9 One reason for
statutorily granting public employees the right to bargain collectively is
to provide an orderly procedure for peacefully resolving disputes over
working conditions."0 An interpretation that excludes wages and other
basic working conditions from the collective bargaining process would
place most of the items that private sector experience indicates give rise
to labor disputes beyond any curative effects of this process. In view of
the equally unsatisfactory alternatives that confronted it, the Oregon
Board's interpretation of the State's Public Employment Relations Act
was perhaps the best resolution possible. Its interpretation avoided
implying a reallocation of governmental power from a generalized
definition of bargainable subjects, and at the same time did not summarily exclude important items from the bargaining process.
The approach adopted by the Oregon Board, however, is not
without difficulties of its own. Since most state legislatures delegate
the power to control public working conditions among a number of
executive officials and bodies, each of which is thereby empowered to
regulate different working conditions for the same class of public employees,5 a court adopting the approach of the Oregon Board must be
prepared to determine which of those officials and commissions should
be required to negotiate over working conditions still subject to the
undelegated powers of the state legislature and to recommend any
agreement reached to the legislature.52 Although the Oregon Board did
not encounter this precise problem, it is certain to occur in many
jurisdictions should the Board's reasoning be used in interpreting a
collective bargaining act that excludes the state legislature from the
definition of the public employer.
Conclusionsand Recommendations on Labor Relations by the Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations, 342 GOV'T Eip. REL. REP. E-1, at E-3 (March 30, 1970).
49. See, e.g., NEW YORK GOVERNOR'S COMM. ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, supranote
33, at 13-14 (1966).
50. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
51. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
52. If a court construes an NLRA-like definition of bargainable subjects as implying a
delegation of legislative power over all matters coming within the definition to a nonlegislative
"public employer" that is authorized or required to engage in collective bargaining, a similar
problem of construction arises. If the "public employer" consists of more than one entity, each or
which already regulates different conditions of public employment for the same class of public
employees, the court must decide which of those entities was intended to receive the delegation of
legislative power that it implied from the collective bargaining act.
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A second difficulty inherent in the Oregon Board's approach stems
from the allocation of power between the state and municipal governments. Since municipal officials are almost uniformly defined in collective bargaining statutes as the "public employer" for the purposes of
bargaining with municipal employees," any locally negotiated collective agreement that concerns municipal employment conditions traditionally established by the state legislature through the exercise of undelegated powers would have to be submitted to the legislature for its
approval. In view of the thousands of municipal governments in every
state, each of which has diverse groups of employees demanding the
bargaining rights extended by state law, the Oregon approach would
force any state legislature that regulates even a single condition of municipal employment through its undelegated powers to devote an inordinate amount of time to the process of approving or rejecting municipal
labor agreements.
B.

Loose v. City of Dearborn Heights

Another interpretative problem that may result in the redistribution of governmental power will confront the judiciaries of the many
jurisdictions which have collective bargaining acts containing generalized definitions of bargainable subjects combined with definitions of the
public employer that exclude the state legislature. The problem arises
whenever the state legislature-or in the case of a home-rule municipality, the constitution-has delegated broad power to establish
working conditions to an entity or official whom the collective bargaining act views as the public employer, but the legislature also has, prior
to the enactment of the bargaining statute, suspended part of its delegated power by establishing some working conditions that the newly
designated public employer must obey in spite of its delegated powers.
When the state legislature interjects a collective bargaining statute
containing a generalized definition of bargainable subjects into this setting, a court construing the act again faces a dilemma: it can decide that
working conditions previously established by state law may now be
changed by bargaining with the nonlegislative public employer, who in
spite of its broad power previously had no authority to modify working
conditions established by state law; or it can instead conclude that working conditions previously established by law constitute implied exceptions to the statutory definition of bargainable subjects. 4
53. See. e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 962(7) (Supp. 1972); N.Y. CIV. SERV.
LAW § 201(6) (MeKinney Supp. 1972).
54. If the legislature is viewed as the public employer, then a prior law establishing a working

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

The Michigan Court of Appeals recently examined this type problem in Loose v. City of Dearborn Heights.55 Dearborn Heights, a home-

rule municipality,56 had promoted a person to the position of Chief of
Police without conducting a competitive examination. A Michigan civil
service statute required competitive examinations for promotions in all
municipal police departments.17 On a petition for mandamus, the trial
judge sustained the validity of the challenged promotion and held that
the Michigan civil service statute setting forth requirements for the
promotion of municipal policemen was impliedly repealed by the subsequent passage of Michigan's Public Employment Relations Act," which

directs public employers to bargain with their employees' representatives over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."59
The court of appeals rejected the trial judge's rationale of implied
repeal; nevertheless, it indicated that a collective bargaining agreement

negotiated with the appropriate municipal employer-in this case, the
City of Dearborn Heights-could change the terms of existing state
law:60 "In our opinion there is no conflict between these provisions of
the civil service act and the public employees' labor relations act. The
civil service act in the instant case provides day-to-day procedural rules

to be followed by the employer. The public employees' act provides the
mechanism for changing those procedural rules."'"
The court of appeals' construction of the State's Public Employ-

ment Relations Act achieves the precise result that the Oregon Board
condition would not preclude it from entering into a collective bargaining agreement that changes
the previously established working condition. A legislative body can always modify an earlier law,
although it may not, except in emergency situations, destroy vested rights created by that law.
Thus, only when the public employer is not a legislative body, but rather an agency or another
branch of government, will a court be called upon to determine whether a statute approving
collective bargaining over working conditions impliedly authorizes the public employer to negotiate
collective agreements that change working conditions previously established by law.
55. 64 CCH Lab. Cas. 67,853 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970).
56. See text accompanying notes 36-40 supra.

57. See

MICH. STAT. ANN.

§ 5.3362 (1969).

58. Michigan's Public Employment Relations Act, MICH.STAT. ANN. § 17.455 (1968), does
not define the words "public employer." Nevertheless, in Loose v. City of DearbornHeights the
trial court and the court of appeals assumed that when municipal employment conditions are
involved, the "public employer" for purposes of collective bargaining is the municipal government.
59. The reported facts do not suggest that the city's failure to promote according to the civil
service statute was in any way related to the collective bargaining process.
60. As a consequence of this decision, when a conflict arises between the working conditions
established under a collective agreement negotiated with a municipal employer and a state law,
the collective agreement governs as to those employees covered by the agreement, but the provisions of the law remain applicable to all public employees not covered by the collective agreement.
61. 64 CCH Lab. Cas. at 67,854.
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sought to avoid under a similar collective bargaining statute in
Typographical,Pressmen's and Bindery Unions v. Personnel Division.
By authorizing an extra-legislative public employer to negotiate collective agreements that supersede state law, the Michigan court used the
general statutory definition of bargainable subjects as the basis for reallocating legislative power over public employee working conditions. In
terms of their eventual impact upon the distribution of governmental
power, any difference between construing a NLRA-like definition of
bargainable subjects as an implied delegation of power, which the Oregon Board rejected, and construing the definition as an implied removal
of limitations on delegated powers, which is the ultimate effect of the
Michigan decision, is illusory.
The final solution adopted by the Oregon Board in a case involving
state employees, however, was not realistically available to the court in
Loose, which was concerned with municipal employees. When municipalities are statutorily required as public employers to bargain over
working conditions, it would be unreasonable for a court to direct them
to negotiate over changes in every state law that establishes municipal
working conditions and then present any agreement reached to the state
legislature for final action. There are too many such laws,' 2 combined
with too many municipal governments, for most state legislatures to
assume the burden of actually giving meaningful consideration to every
tentative agreement that local governments would submit for legislative
approval.
IV.

SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS

The decisions of the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Oregon
Board illustrate two interpretative problems involving the redistribution
of legislative power that public employment labor laws can create when
they combine NLRA-like definitions of bargainable subjects with definitions of the public employer that exclude the state legislature. In order
to avoid such problems and simultaneously preserve their own powers
over state and local working conditions, a few state legislatures have
included in their collective bargaining laws sections providing that public employer collective bargaining agreements cannot supersede state
laws and/or that public employers may conclude agreements only on
matters within their existing delegations of power. 3 Although the in62. In many jurisdictions, state legislatures have enacted detailed laws regulating the hiring
and firing of municipal employees, as well as laws concerning their promotion, transfer, and
discipline. See, e.g., N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 5 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
63. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13080 (West Supp. 1972) (teachers); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3500

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

corporation of such provisions into collective bargaining laws will ensure against judicial interpretations that either expand existing delegations of power to state and local government officials or alter laws that
regulate public working conditions, this type of statutory scheme will
restrict the scope of bargaining to less than that which prevails in the
private sector. Restricting the number of subjects open to the collective
bargaining process decreases the likelihood that collective bargaining
will be an effective dispute settlement device, which is, of course, a
primary reason for introducing bargaining into the public service. 4
There is, however, a method available for preserving existing legislative control over state and municipal working conditions without restricting the scope of collective bargaining. That method would require
the state legislature to participate in the collective bargaining process
whenever bargainable items are established by the exercise of undelegated powers or through laws effecting a suspension of prior delegations
of power. The legislature, of course, could not negotiate as a whole, but
instead would appoint a bargaining representative consisting of a committee of its own members, an executive official, or in the case of
municipal employees, the local government for which the employees
seeking to bargain work. The bargaining representative would be authorized to reach tentative agreements and required to submit such
agreements to the legislature for its final approval or rejection. Two
states recently have amended their statutes authorizing public employer
collective bargaining to establish similar procedures when state employment conditions are involved."
Suggestions of state legislative participation in the collective bargaining process, even to the limited extent described above, have not
gone uncriticized. The most frequently voiced objection is that the views
of civic groups, private organizations, and individual citizens on what
(West Supp. 1972) (municipal employees): CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3525 (West Supp. 1972) (state
employees); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4013 (Supp. 1970) (public school employees); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-4330(a) (Supp. 1971) (public employees except supervisors, teachers, elected and management officials); MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, § 160(k) (1969) (teachers); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
149, § 178(l) (Supp. 1971) (municipal employees); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.66(5)-(6) (Supp.
1972): N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-8.1 (Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.904 (Supp.
1972) (all public employees except policemen, firemen, and transit workers); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
3, § 904 (Supp. 1972) (state employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2004 (Supp. 1972) (teachers).
64. See NATIONAL GOVERNORS CONFERENCE, TASK FORCE ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNIENT LABOR RELATIONS, PRELIMINARY REPORT 36 (1967): "Care should be exercised not to
restrict collective bargaining so unreasonably as to nullify the values of the process. Experience
has shown that employee organizations denied reasonable scope in bargaining-particularly over
the matter of wages-resort to lobbying and political pressure. They attempt a quasi-negotiation
of sorts with the group that sets salaries ....
" Id.
65. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4330 (Supp. 1971); Wisconsin State Employment Labor Relations Act, §§ 111.81(16), .92, 4A LAB. REL. REP. 60:242a (May 1, 1972).
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conditions should prevail in public employment will somehow be entitled to less weight with the legislature once it has entered a collective
bargaining relationship with public employees. The objection, however,
actually concerns the question whether any government official or entity

that controls public employment working conditions should be permitted to bargain collectively, and not the question whether a state legislature, once it has decided that collective bargaining is desirable, should
itself participate in the collective bargaining process. If legislative bodies

cannot attune themselves to the opinions of civic groups, private organizations, and individuals when they engage in collective bargaining, then,
a fortiori, nonlegislative public officials would be no more responsive. 6
A second objection to state legislative participation in the collective
bargaining process stems from the inherent practical difficulties of a
legislature's obligating itself by statute to negotiate through selected
representatives over municipal employment conditions that are estab-

lished by state law. If statutes of this type were enacted, it is unlikely
that most state legislatures could meet their self-imposed commitment
to bargain with the many diverse groups of municipal employees who

perform different jobs for different municipal governments and who
desire to negotiate over matters controlled by the legislature. Quite
simply, there are too many working conditions and too many groups of

municipal employees, 7 as well as too little time available in legislative

sessions, for state legislatures to engage in collective bargaining at the

municipal level, even in the restricted sense of approving or rejecting
tentative agreements negotiated by their own representatives. 8 Indeed,
even if a legislature's collective bargaining obligation included only state
employees, some legislatures, particularly those in large urban states,
would still find themselves unable to act during their legislative session
66. Of course, if the public is dissatisfied with the representation that it receives from a
legislature's bargaining representatives, it can always oust the representatives or their principals
at the next election.
67. Even if the appropriate unit for bargaining with the state legislature were defined to
include all municipal employees performing similar jobs throughout the state, the legislature would
still have to deal with an extensive number of bargaining units. Moreover, the mechanics of defining
those units to include employees scattered throughout the state in different municipalities and
conducting elections for bargaining representatives would be unwieldy.
68. The only collective bargaining law that seemingly requires state legislative consideration
of municipal agreements that conflict with state law or that involve terms necessitating the exercise
of undelegated legislative powers is New York's Taylor Act, N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §§ 200-200.11
(McKinney Supp. 1972). Section 204(a) of that Act requires every collective agreement negotiated
by state executive officials or local governments to include the following provision: "It is agreed
by and between the parties that any provision of this agreement requiring legislative action to
permit its implementation by amendment of law or by providing the additional funds therefore,
shall not become effective until the appropriate legislative body has given approval."
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on all matters that state employees wish to incorporate into collective
bargaining agreements and that require the exercise of undelegated legislative powers or changes in state law for implementation. 9
Thus, in order to produce a meaningful scope of collective bargaining, state legislatures apparently will be forced to relinquish much of
,their control over municipal employment conditions to the municipal
governments and to vest state executive officials with increased power
over the conditions of state employment. Of course, it is unlikely that
any state legislature would be willing to authorize either state executive
officials or local governments to conclude final collective agreements
with employee representatives over working conditions that require appropriations from state tax moneys, nor has that alternative ever been
seriously suggested. But other bargainable working conditions, established either through the exercise of undelegated powers or by laws
suspending earlier delegations of power, could probably be dealt with
more efficiently and without sacrificing any important public interests
through collective bargaining agreements negotiated with state or local
officials. The legislature, however, would not have to forswear any control over the terms of the agreements negotiated by state and local
government officials. If designated officials prove unresponsive to the
interests of the general public when negotiating collective bargaining
agreements, they can be removed by the legislature; moreover, the legislature can always withdraw any powers that it previously has delegated. 71 Once nonmonetary working conditions are removed from state
legislative regulation, a second advantage would accrue from the redistribution of legislative power: the legislature, through its designated
representatives, would have time available to bargain over those matters
that do require financial expenditures from state tax moneys. 7' Hopefully, bargaining over these matters could be accomplished without perpetual delays.
In an effort to produce a meaningful scope of collective bargaining,
four recently adopted public employee labor acts do expand the authority of state and local officials over the conditions of public employ69. Again, even if the unit for bargaining with the state legislature were defined to include
all those state employees who might have some community of interest in the subject to be established, the legislature would still have to negotiate with the representatives of a significant number
of distinct groups of employees.
70. State legislatures would, of course, always be free subsequently to enact laws specifically
providing that their terms cannot be changed by later collective bargaining agreements.
71. In the very rare case when a municipal working condition requires state appropriations
for its implementation, municipal officials could be directed to bargain over these matters at the
request of employee representatives and then to submit any agreement reached to the state legislature for its approval or rejection.
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ment.71Those acts permit state and local officials who already have been
delegated broad powers over public employee working conditions to
conclude collective agreements that supersede state laws which have

established conditions within the statutory definition of bargainable subjects. No state collective bargaining law, however, actually transfers
legislative power that was previously undelegated and exercisable only

by the legislature.
72, The following acts provide that collective bargaining agreements negotiated with specifically designated nonlegislative public employers will prevail over state laws regulating matters
within the statutory definition of bargainable subjects: CAL. PuB. UTIL. CODE § 70124 (West
1965) (transit workers); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-468(b) (Supp. 1969) (municipal employees);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1301-12 (Supp. 1970) (public employees, except teachers and elected
or appointed public officials); MASS. ANN. LAWS Ch. 161A, § 19 (transit workers). See also Postal
Reorganization Act of 1970, 39 U.S.C. § 1005(a)(1)(A) (1970).

